Trojan-Dropper:MSIL/FakeWallet is a trojanized cryptocurrency wallet program that silently installs a backdoor program (Backdoor.Fynloski.C) onto the affected system.
Based on the settings of your F-Secure security product, it will either move the file to the quarantine where it cannot spread or cause harm, or remove it.
A False Positive is when a file is incorrectly detected as harmful, usually because its code or behavior resembles known harmful programs. A False Positive will usually be fixed in a subsequent database update without any action needed on your part. If you wish, you may also:
Check for the latest database updates
First check if your F-Secure security program is using the latest updates, then try scanning the file again.
Submit a sample
After checking, if you still believe the file is incorrectly detected, you can submit a sample of it for re-analysis.
Note: If the file was moved to quarantine, you need to collect the file from quarantine before you can submit it.
Exclude a file from further scanning
If you are certain that the file is safe and want to continue using it, you can exclude it from further scanning by the F-Secure security product.
Note: You need administrative rights to change the settings.
On 15 December 2014, the team behind the Opal-Coin cryptocurrency announced on a popular digital currency forum that a fake Opal-Coin wallet program (F-Secure identifies the malware as Trojan-Dropper:MSIL/FakeWallet) was being distributed on discussion forums. To lure users into installing it, the FakeWallet binary was being promoted as an "updated" version of the genuine wallet application.
As part of its response to this incident, the Opal-Coin team released a document to assist in verifying the authenticity of a crypto-coin wallet program:
On installation, the binary loads a DLL named "Kazyloader.dll" that is embedded in the recourse of the main library. The loaded DLL extracts and decodes a bitmap image in order to run a new executable binary, which contains both the legitimate Opal-Coin wallet (for use as a decoy) and the Fynloski backdoor.
The second executable first checks for the presence of virtual machine emulation (Sandboxie) and network traffic analysis (Wireshark) software, which are likely to be found on systems used by security researchers; if either are found, the program exits and does not continue. It also checks for a specific mutex in order to ensure only one instance of itself is running.
If the executable successfully passes these checks, it extracts the decoy Opal-Coin wallet to the "AppData" directory, using the name "Opalcoin-Qt.exe". It creates a "Live" directory under "AppData/Windows" and copies itself there twice (using the names "csrss.exe" and "winliveid.exe"), and also adds the following registry entries to ensure it remains persistent:
The executable also disables User Account Control (UAC) by setting the value of the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System to "0".
Finally, it extracts the Fynloski backdoor and injects it into one of the following processes:
The Fynloski backdoor has an extensive range of capabilities, including:
Once installed on the system, the backdoor can grant a remote attacker full control of the affected system.