MOBILE THREAT REPORT
Q1 2012
F-Secure Labs

At the F-Secure Response Labs in Helsinki, Finland, and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, security experts work around the clock to ensure our customers are protected from the latest online threats.

Round-the-clock response work takes place in three shifts, one of which is handled in Helsinki, and two in Kuala Lumpur. At any given moment, F-Secure Response Labs staff is on top of the worldwide security situation, ensuring that sudden virus and malware outbreaks are dealt with promptly and effectively.

Protection around the clock

Response Labs work is assisted by a host of automatic systems that track worldwide threat occurrences in real time, collecting and analyzing hundreds of thousands of data samples per day. Criminals who make use of virus and malware to profit from these attacks are constantly at work on new threats. This situation demands around the clock vigilance on our part to ensure that our customers are protected.
ABSTRACT


CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 3

CHANGES IN THE MOBILE THREAT LANDSCAPE 5

Figure 1: Malware Families Detected By Heuristic Detection, Q1 2012 7

LATEST THREATS IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS 8

Figure 2: Mobile Threats by Type, Q1 2012 9

Potentially unwanted software 10

Application: Android/Counterclank.A 11
Application: Android/Steveware.A 11
Exploit: Android/DroidRooter.F 12
Hack-Tool: Android/LoicDos.A 12
Hack-Tool: Android/MemPoDroid.A 13
Monitoring-Tool: Android/AndroidAgent.A 13

Figure 3: Mobile Threats Motivated by Profit per Quarter, 2011-2012 15

Spyware 16

Spyware: Android/Adboo.A 17

Figure 4: New Family or Variant Received per Quarter, 2011-2012 18

Malware 19

Trojan: Android/Binder.B 20
Trojan: Android/Boxer.G 21
Trojan: Android/DroidDream.G, and variant H 21
Trojan: Android/FakeAngry.A 22
Trojan: Android/FakeRegSMS.A, and variant B 22
Trojan:Android/FakeTimer.A  
Trojan:Android/FakeToken.A  
Trojan:Android/FakeUpdates.A  
Trojan:Android/FakeVoice.A  
Trojan:Android/Kituri.A  
Trojan:Android/Kmin.B, and variant C  
Trojan:Android/Moghava.A  
Trojan:Android/Nyearleak.A  
Trojan:Android/OpFake.D  
Trojan:Android/Qicsomos.A  
Trojan:Android/RuFailedSMS.A  
Trojan:Android/Saiva.A  
Trojan:Android/SMSFisher.A  
Trojan:Android/SMSHandler.A  
Trojan:Android/SMSLoader.A  
Trojan:Android/SMStealer.A  
Trojan:Android/SpyService.A  
Trojan-Downloader:Android/RootSmart.A  
Table 1: Mobile Threat Statistics by Platform, 2004-2011  
Table 2: Mobile Threat Statistics by Type, 2004-2011  
Trojan:SymbOS/Farewell.A  
Trojan:SymbOS/SivCaller.A  
Trojan:SymbOS/SilentPusher.A  
Trojan:SymbOS/Yorservi.A, and variants B and D  
Trojan:SymbOS/Zhaomiao  

New variants of already known families  
Table 3: Detection Count for Android Samples Received in Q1 2012  
Figure 5: Android Samples Received in Q1 2012, Sorted by Detection Count
Since its debut, Android has quickly claimed significant market share in the mobile market. Unfortunately, such popularity (amongst other factors) makes Android a lucrative target for malware authors. New families and variants of malware keep cropping up each quarter, and this trend shows no sign of slowing down. In Q1 2011, 10 new families and variants were discovered. A year later, this number has nearly quadrupled with 37 new families and variants discovered in Q1 2012 alone (please refer to Figure 4 on Page 18). A comparison between the number of malicious Android application package files (APKs) received in Q1 2011 and in Q1 2012 reveals a more staggering find — an increase from 139 to 3063 counts. This growth in number can be attributed to malware authors crafting their infected or trojanized applications to defeat anti-virus signature detection, distributing their malware in different application names, and trojanizing widely popular applications.

With Android malware growing exponentially in number, there rises a need to protect users against up-and-coming threats in a more proactive manner. Utilizing cloud-based technology, the heuristics detection implemented in our new product has performed well in detecting unclassified threats based on malicious behavior, and in discovering new malware families and variants. A significant finding this quarter is the discovery of FakeToken.A, a Trojan that pretends to be a token generator for a mobile banking application. It was originally detected as a variant of FakeInst, but turns out to be a newfound related family. Additionally, the heuristics technology is also responsible for discovering Boxer.H, a new variant of the existing Boxer family, which pretends to be Google Play.

In Q1 2012, malware authors are focusing on improving their malware’s techniques in evading detection, as well as exploring new infection methods. Existing malware families such as DroidKungFu, GinMaster, and the FakeInst umbrella family (which consists of Boxer, JiFake, SMSToy, FakeNotify, and OpFake) are adopting encryption and randomization techniques in order to evade detections. At the same time, some malware are also figuring out how to hide their data in an image file, as shown by FakeRegSMS.

Some prominent malware discovered in this quarter are Trojan-Downloader:Android/RootSmart.A, Trojan:Android/DroidKungFu.H, and Trojan:Android/Stiniter.A. They demonstrate an increasing complexity in their evolution or infection behavior. RootSmart.A for instance, downloads a root exploit to gain elevated privileges on the infected device, which allows it to install more applications onto the device. It also has a bot component that can receive command from a server to perform malicious routine such as making unauthorized call, sending premium-rate SMS messages, and accessing pay-per-view videos.
DroidKungFu.H exhibits a tremendous improvement in its infection method. It now only requires a service in a trojanized application in order to load its native or binary component, which contains the rooting or privilege escalation code and the malicious routine, into a device. Once it gains user privileges, the Trojan can make system changes such as dropping the native copy into the system bin folder, and changing the configuration to enable automatic execution of the native component on reboot. By employing this method, the Trojan can no longer be removed easily using the traditional way, i.e., uninstalling the application.

Finally, Stiniter.A employs a different, yet still complex, infection technique. It is a multiple-component malware that has three installed applications, and a native component for rooting and installing other APK components. Similar to DroidKungFu.H, its native component is implemented in a way that no longer requires the generic or precompiled binary exploit. One of its APK can serve as a standalone malware, and can be installed as a service that carries out data gathering and SMS-sending activities.

The three malware (RootSmart.A, DroidKungFu.H, and Stiniter.A) mentioned above suggest that Android malware are focusing on utilizing the native component, and only downloading a root exploit when needed. Even then, the root exploit would be quickly deleted to prevent the malware from being profiled or detected as malicious by anti-virus products since the native component has yet to exist in their packages.

Over the year, Android threats have continued to improve their techniques in evading detection and their methods of infection, yet, nothing much has changed in their operation in collecting profit. The majority of malware discovered in Android markets are SMS-sending malware that reap profit from sending messages to premium numbers. Most of these malware are found on third-party market stores, but occasionally, some do manage to wriggle their way into the official Android Marketplace (now integrated into Google Play).
Mobile Threat Report Q1 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Malware Family</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boxer</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DroidKungFu</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuropaSMS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fakeinst</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fakeinst (FakeToken)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FakeRegSMS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JiFake</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>828</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: Malware Families Detected by Heuristic Detection, Q1 2012**

*Note:* The threat statistics used in Figure 1 are made up of families and variants instead of unique files. For instance, if two samples are detected as Trojan:Android/GinMaster.A, they will only be counted as one in the statistics.
LATEST THREATS IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS
FIGURE 2: MOBILE THREATS BY TYPE, Q1 2012

NOTE: The threat statistics used in Figure 2 are made up of families and variants instead of unique files. For instance, if two samples are detected as Trojan:Android/GinMaster.A, they will only be counted as one in the statistics.
Potentially unwanted software

We consider the following program as potentially unwanted software, which refers to programs that may be considered undesirable or intrusive by a user if used in a questionable manner.
Application: Android/Counterclank.A

Counterclank.A is a Trojan that poses as a game application. While running, it retrieves information from the compromised device on which it was installed on. The information includes:

- IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) number
- Phone number
- Operating system version

The Trojan then connects to a remote server, and forwards the retrieved information.

Application: Android/Steveware.A

Steveware.A attracts users by offering popular game applications at no charge, under the pretense of offering the trial versions.

During installation, it displays a message requesting for users to enter their email addresses to unlock the full version. The exact message is as follows:

“Please click here to finish the installation process.
To unlock the full version of this game for free, enter your email on the page and return to this application.”
Exploit: Android/DroidRooter.F

DroidRooter.F makes its way onto a device through another program; it is downloaded by Trojan-Downloader:Android/RootSmart.A. Once installed, it will root the device and gain root permissions that would allow it to run services or perform actions without any user intervention.

Hack-Tool: Android/LoicDos.A

Upon installation, LoicDos.A requests for the ‘Network communication’ permission, which will grant it full Internet access on the compromised device. When executed, it opens up to a website that contains Javascript to perform denial of service attack on a targeted server.

LoicDos.A requesting for full Internet access

LoicDos.A getting ready to perform DoS attack
Hack-Tool: Android/MemPoDroid.A

This is the Android port of the recently released “Mempodipper” exploit that affects the non-Android distribution of the Linux kernel.

MemPoDroid.A is an Android Native binary executable that exploits the mem_write function in the Android Linux kernel version 2.6.39 and above. This version of Android Linux kernel is commonly found on newer releases of Android devices, which runs on the Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich) version of operating system.

A successful exploitation may result in gaining a major user access to the affected device, granting the attacker the capability to perform any action on the device.

**NOTE:** For additional details on the Mempodipper exploit, please refer to ‘Linux Local Privilege Escalation via SUID /proc/pid/mem Write’ at [http://blog.zx2c4.com/749](http://blog.zx2c4.com/749).

Monitoring-Tool: Android/AndroidAgent.A

During installation, AndroidAgent.A requests for a number of permissions that will allow it to access contact data, SMS messages, location and Internet access on the affected device.

Once installed, it hides its presence by not placing any significant icon on the home screen.

![Permissions requested by AndroidAgent.A](image-url)
AndroidAgent.A silently records all incoming and outgoing calls, and checks for specific incoming SMS messages. The content found at the beginning of these messages will determine further actions to be carried out next.

- **0#** : Master Number. Store the number from the sender as Administrator.
- **99#** : Register Shareware. Use the number to register shareware.
- **9#** : Send an SMS message containing IMEI and SIM serial number to the Master Number.
- **18#** : Store the string after ‘#’ as ‘UserName,’ and use it for uploading recorded files in a remote location.
- **10#** : Start ‘MyPeopleService’ that sends SMS messages containing contact details from the phone book to the Master Number.
- **8#** : Start ‘MyLocationService’ that sends the location of the device.

**Shareware**: A proprietary software offered as a trial version with limited functionality or availability.
NOT PROFIT-MOTIVATED

PROFIT-MOTIVATED

Q1 2011

Q2 2011

Q3 2011

Q4 2011

Q1 2012

FIGURE 3: MOBILE THREATS MOTIVATED BY PROFIT PER QUARTER, 2011-2012

NOTE: The threat statistics used in Figure 2 are made up of families and variants instead of unique files. For instance, if two samples are detected as Trojan:Android/GinMaster.A, they will only be counted as one in the statistics.
Spyware

Programs categorized as spyware secretly collect information about a user’s browsing habits, search strings, site preferences and preferred applications. This collected information is either sent out to another party or stored locally.
Spyware:Android/Adboo.A

Adboo.A is an application that lets users select a pre-composed message from the provided list, and send it to their contacts. These messages are grouped into four categories: New Year wishes, friendship, love, and jokes.

When a message is selected, the application prompts a dialog box asking for the next action: Contact, Edit or Cancel. If Contact is selected, it tries to read the stored contact data. Presumably, it needs to know to whom the message should be sent to.

However, once the contact data is obtained, it does not send the message to the intended recipient, and displays the message “Sending fail.” Instead, it silently collects the following details from the device:

- Device model
- Operating system version
- Phone number
- IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) number

These details are then forwarded to a remote server. A look at Adboo.A’s certificate revealed that it comes from the same developer of Trojan:Android/Zsone.A which was discovered in Q2 2011.
FIGURE 4: NEW FAMILY OR VARIANT RECEIVED PER QUARTER, 2011-2012

NOTE: The threat statistics used in Figure 4 are made up of families and variants instead of unique files. For instance, if two samples are detected as Trojan:Android/GinMaster.A, they will only be counted as one in the statistics.
Malware

Programs categorized as malware are generally considered to pose a significant security risk to the user’s system and/or information.

Malicious actions carried out by these programs include (but are not limited to) installing hidden objects as well as hiding the objects from the user, creating new malicious objects, damaging or altering any data without authorization, and stealing any data or access credentials.
**Trojan: Android/Binder.B**

Upon installation, Binder.B requests for permissions that will allow it to access contact data, SMS messages and location of the device.

Binder.B pretending to be an application called Blob Demo, and requesting some permissions.

It collects the following device information:

- SIM serial number
- IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) number
- IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) number
- Phone number

It then connects to a remote server, and receives further command to perform the following missions:

- Send SMS messages to certain number for N times
- Download and install APKs from given URL

The applications that Binder.B are instructed to install are as follows:

- com.taobao.mobile.dipei
- com.tencent.qqpimsecure
- com.renren.mobile.android
- com.kandian.hdtogoapp
- com.uc.browser
- com.tencent.mtt
Binder.B is programmed to install selected APKs onto the device

Any message that contains these keywords in the content will be blocked:

- 83589523
- 83589523
- 客服电话 ("customer service phone number")
- 元/条 ("dollar /one message")
- 元/次 ("dollar /time")
- 本次元 ("one time 1 dollar")
- 本次2元 ("one time 2 dollar")

**Trojan:Android/Boxer.G**

Boxer.G pretends to be an installer for a legitimate application, but is actually an SMS-sending Trojan. It sends out SMS messages to premium numbers, and collects profit from the charges being billed to the user’s account.

These are the premium numbers that Boxer.G sends out SMS messages to:

- 2855
- 7151
- 9151

**Trojan:Android/DroidDream.G, and variant H**

Similar to the previous variants, the G and H variants of DroidDream also collect and send information about the compromised device to a remote server. Collected details are:

- IMEI number
- IMSI number
- Device model
- Contact information
- Inbox and outbox SMS messages

These Trojans are also capable of sending SMS messages to every contact listed in the device, as well as creating messages in the inbox that appear to be coming from one of the listed contacts.
**Trojan:Android/FakeAngry.A**


It gathers information from the compromised device, and sends the information to a remote location. Listed below are the details collected by FakeAngry.A:

- Device ID
- IMEI number
- IMSI number
- SDK version
- SIM serial number
- Subscriber ID

**Trojan:Android/FakeRegSMS.A, and variant B**

The FakeRegSMS Trojans are fake installers that install no real application on the device, but collect profit from signing up the user for a subscription based service.

During installation, the Trojans request for permissions that will allow the following actions:

- Modifying SD card contents
- Sending out SMS messages
- Reading the device’s information

In the latter variant, the Trojan utilizes a pseudo-cryptic technique to conceal information in a PNG image file. The same image is used as the icon, and it becomes visible during and after the installation.

---

**RELATED LABS WEBLOG POST**

Android malware employs steganography? Not quite...

**Trojan:Android/FakeTimer.A**

FakeTimer.A installs a service named ‘KitchenTimerService’ onto the device, and accesses a website containing adult or pornographic contents.

It retrieves the following information, which it later forwards to a remote server.

- Phone number
- Device ID

**Trojan:Android/FakeToken.A**

FakeToken.A pretends to be a mobile token generator, but is actually a Mobile Transaction Authentication Number (mTAN) interceptor. When installed, it intercepts SMS messages and looks for the mTAN, which it later forwards to a remote location or to a user.

**mTAN**: A number that is generated by a bank and sent to a user’s mobile device to validate an online transaction. The user must enter this number before proceeding with the transaction.
The Trojan installs a service that may start the following event:

- **SMS_RECEIVED**, upon receiving an SMS message
- **PHONE_STATE**, upon detecting a change in the device’s state such as lock or standby mode to active mode
- **BOOT_COMPLETED**, upon completing device booting

It also keeps an XML configuration file, which contains the details on where to send the intercepted SMS messages.

```xml
<settingsSet>
   <catchSmsList class="java.util.ArrayList"/>
   <deleteSmsList class="java.util.ArrayList"/>
   <number>79021121067</number>
   <version>1.0</version>
   <smsPrefix>santander</smsPrefix>
   <sendSmsResultList class="java.util.ArrayList"/>
   <serverList class="java.util.ArrayList">http://hop.ru/</serverList>
      <string>http://best.com/</string>
   <serverList>
      <serverPrefix>qe4af23r4e2</serverPrefix>
      <sid>sid_1</sid>
      <period>43200</period>
      <timeConnection>1334662812611</timeConnection>
   </serverList>
   <sendInitSms>false</sendInitSms>
</settingsSet>
```

Additionally, it may also forward the following information to a remote location:

- IMEI number
- IMSI number
- Device model
- Phone number
- SID (System Identification Number) code

**Trojan:Android/FakeUpdates.A**

Once installed, FakeUpdates.A silently starts a service named ‘GoogleServicesFramework’ in the background.

It connects to a remote server, and posts the following information:

- IMEI number
- IMSI number
- Operating system version
- Device model
FakeUpdates.A silently starting the ‘GoogleServicesFramework’ service

The Trojan also decrypts URLs that are stored at another remote location. From the location, it obtains a list of applications. These applications are later downloaded and stored in the download folder in the SD card.

FakeUpdate.A trying to download an application from the list

Downloaded applications are stored in the download folder in the SD card
**Trojan: Android/FakeVoice.A**

FakeVoice.A is a Trojan that promotes itself as a voice changing application to users in Israel. Upon execution, it prompts the following questions:

- What number do you want to dial?
- Which sound do you want to be heard in?
  - Low and scary voice
  - Normal voice
  - High funny voice

The service would cost 6 NIS/minute. During the call, users can press ‘9’ to change the voice to a higher pitch or press ‘8’ for lower pitch.

In addition to the charged service, FakeVoice.A also makes a call to 01240900720674, which is a premium service number in Romania.

**Trojan: Android/Kituri.A**

Upon execution, Kituri.A displays a ‘User Agreement’ to distract users from noticing suspicious activities that take place in the background.

The Trojan sends the device’s IMEI number to a remote server. It also connects to a remote location to obtain a list of premium numbers to which it will send SMS messages to.

NIS: Denotes Israeli New Shekel, the currency of the State of Israel.
Kituri.A displaying the “User Agreement”

**Trojan:Android/Kmin.B, and variant C**

Upon execution, the Kmin Trojans prompt a message asking whether the user would like to install a certain application, which would incur some charges to the user’s bill.

Kmin.B and Kmin.C asking whether user wants to install a charged application

However, even if the user declines to install this application, the Trojan still proceeds to performing one of these malicious actions:

- Sending IMEI and phone number to a remote server
- Sending SMS messages to a premium number, 10669500718
- Downloading and installing another application
- Running services in the background
ONE OF THE MORE INTERESTING MOBILE PHONE Malware Trends WE’VE SEEN IN RECENT MONTHS IS THE GROWTH OF TROJANS THAT “DELIVER ON THEIR PROMISES”. IN THE PAST, MOST OF THE PROFIT DRIVEN TROJANS AIMED AT MOBILE PHONE USERS PROVIDED A DECOY ERROR MESSAGE AND ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE THE USER THAT INSTALLATION OF THE SO-CALLED “FREE BROWSER” (TYPICALLY FOR SYMBIAN OR WINDOWS MOBILE) HAD FAILED. MANY FOLKS WOULD THEN DO A WEB SEARCH FOR THE ERROR MESSAGE, EITHER BECAUSE THEY WERE SUSPICIOUS OR BECAUSE THEY WANTED TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROBLEM, AND AT THAT POINT, THEY OFTEN DISCOVERED THAT THE ERROR MESSAGE WAS FAKE AND THAT THEY HAD COMPROMISED THE SECURITY OF THEIR PHONE.

TODAY WHAT WE’RE SEEING ARE MALICIOUS ANDROID APPLICATIONS THAT HAVE BUNDLED LEGITIMATE APPS SUCH AS ROVIO’S ANGRY BIRDS SPACE. FIRST THE MALICIOUS “WRAPPER” TRICKS AND MANIPULATES THE USER INTO GRANTING PERMISSIONS THAT ALLOW THE MALWARE TO SUBSCRIBE TO PREMIUM RATE SERVICES. BUT THEN... THE MALWARE ACTUALLY DOES INSTALL A WORKING COPY OF THE PROMISED GAME. AT THIS POINT, THERE IS LITTLE TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF AND NOTHING TO TROUBLESHOOT. THE USER GETS THE GAME THAT HE WAS PROMISED.

WITH THIS NEW PARADIGM, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN JUST HOW LONG IT TAKES VICTIMS TO ACTUALLY REALIZE THAT THEY’VE BEEN VICTIMIZED.

-SEAN SULLIVAN,
SECURITY ADVISOR, F-SECURE LABS
@FSLabsAdvisor
Trojan: Android/Moghava.A

Moghava.A is a Trojanized application that was circulating in third party websites. Unlike most Android malware, it is not designed for monetary profit but rather for political ridicule.

Moghava.A’s malicious activity is triggered off whenever the device boots up, and continues to go on for a certain time interval. When the device boots up, it activates a service named ‘stamper.’ This service waits for five minutes before proceeding to search for JPEG image files stored in the memory card, looking in the /sdcard/DCIM/Camera/ location in particular because that is where pictures taken from the device’s camera are stored.

For every found image file, it will superimpose another image on top of the original one. This routine will be repeated over and over in every five minutes, which effectively increases the size of the image file, and consumes the free space in the memory card.

Below is an example showing the image before and after modification:
**Trojan:Android/Nyearleak.A**

Nyearleak.A is a Trojan that disguises as a wallpaper application using the 2012 New Year celebration as a theme, while secretly collecting and sending out the following information from the device:

- Device ID
- Google account
- Email address
- Installed packages

![Nyearleak.A disguising as a New Year themed wallpaper](image)

**Trojan:Android/OpFake.D**

The Opfake Trojan was first discovered in Symbian and Windows Mobile devices, but now has made its way to the Android platform.

![OpFake.D requesting for the permission to send SMS messages](image)

**RELATED LABS WEBLOG POST**


Similar to its counterpart on other platforms, Opfake.D also masquerades as an Opera mini application. During installation, it only requests for one permission, which is to send out SMS messages.

When OpFake.D is launched, it sends out SMS messages to certain numbers. The messages’ contents and telephone numbers are stored in an encoded file named ‘config.xml’ but can be decoded using base64 decoding.

The content of the SMS messages, and the recipient number

**Trojan:Android/Qicsomos.A**

Qicsomos.A promotes itself as an application called ‘Détecteur de Carrier IQ,’ a French term that translates to Carrier IQ Detector. It claims to detect and remove a controversial application, Carrier IQ, from the device.

In 2011, Carrier IQ was a source of some concern for security researchers and privacy advocates, as the application was alleged to have been silently installed by telecom operators onto their customer’s devices and used to gather information, including data usage and location details.

Qicsomos.A essentially takes advantage of fears raised by this issue to trick users into installing it.
When user clicks the ‘Désinstaller’ (Uninstall) button, it will send out four SMS messages to the number 81168, containing these texts:

- AT37
- MC49
- SP99
- SP93

The malware then asks for the permission to uninstall itself.

Qicsomos.A asking whether the user wants to uninstall the application

NOTE: For additional details on Carrier IQ, please refer to ‘Carrier IQ: What it is, what it isn’t, and what you need to know’ (http://www.engadget.com/2011/12/01/carrier-iq-what-it-is-what-it-isnt-and-what-you-need-to/)

Trojan:Android/RuFailedSMS.A

RuFailedSMS.A was found in third-party Android markets, targeting users in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. It pretends to be the installers for a range of applications, some of which are listed below:

- Add_It_Up
- Advanced_Launcher_Lite
- AmazingMaze_supLitesup
- Analog_Clock_Collection
- Animal_Sudoku
- AnySoftKeyboard
- AnySoftKeyboard_Slovak_Language_Pack
- AppInventor_Toggle
- Arrow_Caz
- Astronomical_Flashlight
- BentoCam
Upon installation, RuFailedSMS.A requests for permissions that would allow it to access Internet and send SMS messages among others. It was designed to reap profit from sending out SMS messages to premium numbers, but because of a glitch in its code, it fails to execute the malicious routine.

Trojan:Android/Saiva.A

Saiva.A was discovered around Valentine’s Day, and is another malware that derives profit from SMS-sending activities. Upon execution, it displays a fake progress bar.

It pretends to be amidst downloading a task, but is actually sending out SMS messages containing the text “rb9816” to the number “5370.” After that, it displays a fake message in Russian, supposedly notifying about a system failure. The exact message, translated to English, is as follows:

“Unfortunately there was a system failure. Restart the application again and you would find out the name of the person sending you the Valentine”
Fake progress bar and failure message displayed by Saiva.A

**Trojan:Android/SMSFisher.A**

SMSFisher.A contains a malicious package named ‘fish.’ Upon execution, it silently sends out SMS messages without the user’s consent. To hide its track, this Trojan represses the system from prompting the notification about the SMS charge by aborting the broadcast of messages that contain or start with “+86” or “10.”

**Trojan:Android/SMSHandler.A**

SMSHandler.A arrives in a package named ‘com.google.smshandler.’ During installation, it requests for permissions to access SMS messages, phone calls, and storage contents.

Once installed, it does not place any icon on the screen to avoid being noticed by the device’s user. Its suspicious SMS-sending activity takes place when the device is being rebooted.

Permissions requested by SMSHandler.A
Trojan: Android/SMSLoader.A

SMSLoader.A arrives as an application named ‘Fail_Android.’ Upon execution, it displays a progress bar to indicate that a file is being downloaded, along with a message that is read as:

“Attention! Wait for download file...”

![Fake progress bar and message displayed by SMSLoader.A](image)

This Trojan silently sends out SMS messages with the content “5+125 7-14-654-1323359428100” to the following premium numbers:

- 5373
- 7250
- 7099

Trojan: Android/SMStealer.A

SMStealer.A pretends to be an “Updater” application, claiming to locate and correct errors in the device’s system and applications.

![SMStealer.A claiming to locate and correct errors in the system](image)
But its real activity is connecting to a remote location, and sending out the following information:

- IMEI number
- Device ID and operator
- Inbox and outbox SMS messages

**Trojan:Android/SpyService.A**

After installation, SpyService.A does not place any significant icon on the home screen to hide its presence from the device user. It silently accesses the following details from the compromised device:

- IMEI number
- IMSI number
- SIM serial number
- Phone number
- Device model
- Network operator
- SMS messages

**Trojan-Downloader:Android/RootSmart.A**

RootSmart.A disguises itself as ‘系统快捷设置’ (Quick System Settings).

Upon starting up, it connects to a command and control (C&C) server, forwarding the following information:

- IMEI number
- IMSI number
- Operating system version
- Package name
Next, it connects to a remote location to obtain the GingerBreak root exploit needed to gain root permission on the compromised device. From the location, RootSmart.A downloads a file named ‘shells.zip,’ which contains three components:

- Exploit – GingerBreak root exploit (Detected as Exploit:Android/Droidrooter.F)
- Install script – bash script to install root shell in system directory
- Installapp script – bash script to install other malicious applications

Additionally, the Trojan also downloads other malicious applications from the C&C server, and silently installs these applications onto the compromised device.

**NOTE:** For additional details on the GingerBreak exploit, please refer to ‘Android Botnet Exploits Gingerbread Root Access’ (http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/mobile/232600576)
## TABLE 1: MOBILE THREAT STATISTICS BY PLATFORM, 2004-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platform</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Android</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iOS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2ME</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PocketPC</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TABLE 2: MOBILE THREAT STATISTICS BY TYPE, 2004-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adware</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backdoor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbage</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hack-Tool</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring-Tool</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riskware</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spyware</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan-Downloader</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worm</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NOTE:
The threat statistics used in Table 1 and Table 2 are made up of families and variants instead of unique files. For instance, if two samples are detected as Trojan:Android/GinMaster.A, they will only be counted as one in the statistics.
Trojan:SymbOS/Farewell.A

Farewell.A is programmed to terminate application processes with unique identifiers (UIDs) belonging to anti-virus vendors. Upon installation, it executes its first binary, which sends out an SMS message containing the text “I get home” to the number ’13709586492.’ When it is being uninstalled, the first binary is once again executed, sending a “Goodbye” message to the same recipient number.

Farewell.A's installer also contains a launch point that will execute another binary in the package when the device is booted. This second executable downloads a configuration from a remote server, and proceeds to send out SMS messages. Further network connections are made by using the regular HTTP stack and raw TCP sockets. But for some reason, if the device is locked, any process that has “360” in its name will be killed off before any network connection can be made.

Trojan:SymbOS/SivCaller.A

SivCaller.A is a Trojan that downloads and installs new components into the compromised device, without needing any user intervention. When the main executable is launched, it kills processes that belong to anti-virus products. It also modifies bookmarks in the web browser, and intercepts incoming SMS messages before they are placed in the inbox.
SivCaller.A is programmed to kill processes that belong to anti-virus products

**Trojan:SymbOS/SilentPusher.A**

SilentPusher.A is a Trojan that sends out and monitors SMS messages. To prevent user from noticing its SMS sending activity, it represses the message notifications from showing up.

This is done by changing the SMS ringtone to a silent MP3 included in the installer package, and by killing the message notification service (ncnlist.exe).

However, the action of repressing the message notifications is only performed when SilentPusher.A is waiting for its own messages, most likely confirmation messages from premium services. Normal message notifications are restored afterwards.

Aside from sending SMS messages, other activities that SilentPusher.A carries out include killing processes that belong to anti-virus vendors, harvesting IMEI and IMSI numbers, and connecting to various remote servers over the Internet connection.
SilentPusher.A is programmed to kill processes that belong to anti-virus products.

**Trojan:SymbOS/Yorservi.A, and variants B and D**

The first variant, Yorservi.A, connects to several remote hosts using raw TCP sockets. It then silently downloads and installs some components, without the device user’s consent.

The second variant, Yorservi.B, contains an uninstallation feature. When it is being uninstalled from a device, it instantly kills the uninstallation process. Its other capabilities include monitoring calls, reading call logs, and reading and sending SMS messages.

Yorservi.D, the other variant, is programmed to kill the ‘connmon.exe’ service to prevent user from noticing that network connections have been created. It has a scrambled configuration file which contains a list of unique identifiers (UIDs). This variant also starts new processes, and downloads and installs new software silently.
Trojan:SymbOS/Zhaomiao

Trojans in the Zhaomiao family have been around since last year, but recent analysis discovered that some variants have been employing similar keys to decrypt their configuration files.

Samples from the Zhaomiao family contain an encrypted configuration file; it can be decrypted using the DES key ‘DDH#X%LT’ which is hardcoded in the malicious bytecode. Once decrypted, the file reveals a list of fast-flux sites.

Fast-flux: A technique of abusing the Domain Name System (DNS) to protect an IP address from being identified. Often used by cybercriminals to hide their activities from being tracked down.

This same decryption key was spotted in a number of samples, which are later detected as Trojan:SymbOS/Zhaomiao.E. However, Zhaomiao.B was also found to use this key to decrypt a local configuration file.

Another DES key, ‘DOW#MD%D,’ was also found to be commonly used by the Zhaomiao family. In one instance, it was used by Zhaomiao.E to decrypt the local configuration file.
In the same Symbian sample, the key used to decrypt the configuration data is similar to that used by Trojan:Android/DroidDream.B. In the Symbian sample, the key decrypts a configuration data downloaded from a remote host; in DroidDream.B, the key is used to decrypt a local configuration file.
New variants of already known families

The following is a list of new variants of existing malware families. Their functionality is not significantly different compared to the earlier variants described in previous reports.

» Trojan:Android/Boxer.H
» Trojan:Android/DroidDream.G
» Trojan:Android/DroidKungFu.H
» Trojan:Android/Fakeinst.E, and variant F and G
### TABLE 3: DETECTION COUNT FOR ANDROID SAMPLES RECEIVED IN Q1 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DETECTION</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heuristics</td>
<td>828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application:Android/Counterclank.A</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application:Android/Steveware.A</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploit:Android/DroidRooter.F</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hack-Tool:Android/LoicDos.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hack-Tool:Android/MemPoDroid.A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring-Tool:Android/AndroidAgent.A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spyware:Android/Adboo.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Binder.B</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Boxer.G</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Boxer.H</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/DroidDream.G</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/DroidKungFu.H</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeAngry.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeNotify.A **</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeNotify.B **</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeRegSMS.A</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeRegSMS.B</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeTimer.A</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeUpdates.A</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeVoice.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Fakeinst.E</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Fakeinst.F</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Fakeinst.G</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Kituri.A</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Kmin.C</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Moghava.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Nyearleak.A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/OpFake.D</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Qicsomos.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/RuFailedSMS.A</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Saiva.A</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/SMSFisher.A</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/SMSHandler.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/SMSLoader.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/SMStealer.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/SpyService.A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Stiniter.A</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan-Downloader:Android/RootSmart.A</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** This variant was discovered in late Q4 2011.
### FIGURE 5: ANDROID SAMPLES RECEIVED IN Q1 2012, SORTED BY DETECTION COUNT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Malware Type</th>
<th>Detection Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeNotify.A</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/RuFailedSMS.A</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Binder.B</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Fakeinst.E</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/SMSFisher.A</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Fakeinst.F</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan-Downloader:Android/RootSmart.A</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeTimer.A</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Kituri.A</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeUpdates.A</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application:Android/Steveware.A</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Fakeinst.G</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Boxer.H</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Boxer.G</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeNotify.B</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeRegSMS.A</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/DroidDream.G</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application:Android/Counterclank.A</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeRegSMS.B</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/OpFake.D</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Saiva.A</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/SpyService.A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hack-Tool:Android/MemPoDroid.A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring-Tool:Android/AndroidAgent.A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Nyearleak.A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploit:Android/DroidRooter.F</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spyware:Android/Adboo.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeAngry.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/FakeVoice.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Kmin.C</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/LoicDos.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Moghava.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/Qicsomos.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/SMSHandler.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/SMSLoader.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan:Android/SMStealer.A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Protecting the Irreplaceable

Document made public since: 11 May 2012

F-Secure proprietary materials. © F-Secure Corporation 2012. All rights reserved.

F-Secure and F-Secure symbols are registered trademarks of F-Secure Corporation and F-Secure names and symbols/logos are either trademark or registered trademark of F-Secure Corporation.