Additional Details
Messev installs itself to memory using the last MCB block and
immediately passes control to its body there. First the virus
traces Int 13h and Int 21h. Then the virus tries to infect hard
disk with Gwar boot virus. It uses direct calls to Int 13h and
Int 21h handlers during this procedure.
To safely infect MBR the virus tries to delete Windows 95 floppy
device driver HSFLOP.PDR located in \System\IOSubSys folder, but
there's an error in the virus and this never happens. The virus
checks for presence of Gwar in memory and if it is not present
the hard disk in infected - the original MBR is copied to 0/0/2
(h/t/s) and the Gwar is copied to 0/0/1 (h/t/s). Because of this
trick logical hard disks become inaccessible when booting from a
system diskette.
After dropping the Gwar the virus traps Int 13h and Int 21h. Then
it gets attributes of C:\COMMAND.COM, and passes control to
original infected file code.
COM and DOS EXE files are infected by Messev on access. The
original 12 bytes from the file start are copied to the end of
the virus body and then the virus attaches itself to a file. Time
stamp of infected file is not modified except for seconds value -
it is set to 60. Some programs that are bigger than 400k and some
packed programs could become unusable after infection. When
infected files are copied to floppy disk they appear to be clean.
The virus has the following text strings:
'This is a pretty lame virus, I only released it'
'coz I wanted to infect some ppl.'
'Messev - Screwed version.'
'If I don't pass... f*ck it! SKLSUX!'
'My gun will be your angel of mercy!'
'[ DEMANUFACTURE - FEAR FACTORY ]
The virus uses anti-debugging tricks. It halts keyboard and if it
fails performs a trick with stack values and writes garbage to
DOS Boot record. This could happen if the program is debugged
inaccurately.
The stealth procedure of the virus hides all signs of virus
presence in infected objects. When archivers (ARJ.EXE, PKZIP.EXE,
LHA.EXE and RAR.EXE), CHKDSK or TBSCAN are executed the virus
disables its stealth routines.
[Analysis: Alexey Podrezov, Szor Peter, F-Secure, 1997]